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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EARL W. SADLEIR, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
jfELVIN G. KNAPTON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8374 
Respondent's Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as the defendant claims that the evidence 
is insufficient to warrant the verdict of the jury, we deem 
it desirable to enlarge upon the statement of facts con-
tained in Appellant's brief by summarizing plaintiff's 
evidence. 
In describing the relationship between himself and 
the defendant, the plaintiff testified that the defendant 
was as close as anybody could be. "He was my buddy". 
(R. 13). During all their naval career, they were together 
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on every assignment and even had the same rating. Prac-
tically all of their liberty and off-duty time was spent 
together and considerable of their on-duty time was 
sp~nt together CR. 14). ·Over a period of years following 
their discharge from the Navy, they perpetuated their 
friendship (R. 10-11). 
The plaintiff loved his wife at the time the divorce 
was obtained, and w.an,ted the family relationship to 
continue. He hoped that she would come back even if she 
got the .divorce (R. 31). She had her mind made up and 
the defendant influenced it that way (R. 32). She is no\v 
married to defendant, Kn-apton, (R.·11); Plaintiff misses 
his children very much (R. 34). Plaintiff and his former 
wife arranged their lives around the children most of 
the time. He had no interests outside of his home in the 
form of club me~berships · or entertainments or things 
of that kind. He and his wife had never quarreled and 
prior to the separation she had never complained to him 
of anything that dissatisfied her with the marriage (R. 
35). 
A neighbo1', M·rs. Fred W. Arbogast, lived next door 
t~ the Sadleirs between 1947 and November of 1953. She 
first saw the defendant, Knapton, at the plaintiff's wed-
ding whete he was. an usher. She observed that th~ 
defendant was a very frequent visitor at plaintiff's home, 
and that .he called more than two or three times a week 
{R. 51). Heoften cam~.before dark and left very late in 
the night .. She also observed that the defendant ate meals 
at the plaintiff!·s .home many times. During 1953, de-
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fendant would call four or five times a week at plaintiff's 
home. Commencing at about November, 1953, there were 
numerous instances in which defendant would have his 
arms around plaintiff's wife. She saw defendant a num-
ber of times fondling plaintiff's wife and nestling up to 
her (R. 54). She made no effort to observe these things. 
The incidents were just thrust upon her view. Many 
times she went next door to the plaintiff's house after 
her child, and on many occasions the defendant was there 
and the plaintiff was not. On some of the occasions she 
found the doors locked and the blinds drawn (R. 55). 
The blinds were very often drawn during the period of 
several months prior to November, 1953 (R. 56). 
The witness observed that the defendant had meals 
at the plaintiff's home on practically every visit. She 
could see them through the window of her house (R. 57). 
Plaintiff's mother testified that she lived just across 
the corner from plaintiff's home (R. 59). She knew that 
the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant was 
very close. She first objected in May of 1953, to the visits 
defendant made upon the plaintiff's wife. Prior to that, 
she was aware of the frequency of defendant's visits at 
her son's home (R. 60). Defendant would call right after 
5:00 o'clock p.m. and plaintiff's wife would fix him 
supper. Plaintiff had gone to work at 3:00 o'clock p.m. 
(R. 61). In the latter part of May, 1953, she told defend-
ant that he was causing trouble by coming so often when 
plaintiff was not at home; that she didn't want to cause 
trouble between the plaintiff and defendant; that she 
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would appreciate it if defendant would stop coming when 
plaintiff was not at home. She said, "At that time I had 
a lot of respect for Mel, (defendant), and I didn't want 
to.hurt him, nor Vera, nor Earl, and I felt terrible about 
it, and so, they were going on this canyon trip, and I said 
to him, we won't say anything to Vera and Earl and you 
go on the canyon trip and have a good time. When you 
some back you just gradually stop coming only when Earl 
is home." (R. 63). Thereafter, plaintiff's wife told him 
in Knapton's presence that plaintiff's mother had or-
dered Knapton out of plaintiff's house (R. 24). Plaintiff 
befriended Knapton and rebuked his mother (R. 25 ). 
After they returned from the canyon trip, the plaintiff's 
mother observed that defendant was at plaintiff's home 
every night when plaintiff was not at home (R. 63). 
After the two conversations involving defendant which 
occurred in May, 1953, plaintiff's mother had no further 
conversations with the defendant prior to the separation 
which occurred in January, 1954. Plaintiff's wife had 
never complained to his mother about her interferring 
in their affairs (R. 67). There were never any harsh 
words between plaintiff's mother and his wife. Plain-
tiff's wife was always sweet to his mother. When 
plaintiff's mother heard his wife testify in court, that 
was the first time she ever knew that she had hurt Vera 
in any way (R. 68). 
Another next door neighbor named Ida Oakley testi-
fied that from the marriage of the plaintiff and his wife, 
which occurred in 1947, until the separation they ap-
peared :to be a very fine couple, very mueh in love, hand 
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in hand all the time. She observed that plaintiff loved 
his children because he was constantly with them and 
tended them and did what he could to help (R. 73). Dur-
ing 1952-53, defendant came four or five times a week 
to plaintiff's home. He would come around 5:00 o'clock 
p.m. and stay very late. Several times the witness 
observed defendant in the swing at night on the porch 
at plaintiff's home with plaintiff's wife. In April, 1952, 
the witness saw the defendant "love all over her (plain-
tiff's wife), ... putting his head on her chest and having 
his arms around her, and when she was ironing she 
would have to crawl back under his arm to go get a piece 
of material to bring back to iron, and she wouldn't be 
no more than back to her ironing board than he would 
have his arm around her again." This conduct continued 
on through 1952, 1953. The witness never spoke to 
plaintiff about it (R. 36), nor to plaintiff's wife (R. 77). 
She talked to plaintiff's mother about it in May, 1953 
(R. 78). 
Cleo Torgorsen, another neighbor, testified that she 
lived in that neighborhood for eight years (R. 80). That 
she used to see plaintiff's wife ironing in the living room 
and dining room in plaintiff's home when defendant 
would walk up and kiss her, and put his arms around 
her all the time (R. 85). The defendant called at plain-
tiff's home during 1952, 1953 every night. He came from 
work and left ten minutes or five minutes before plaintiff 
would come home. Plaintiff would come home about a 
quarter to midnight. She also testified concerning the 
front-porch incidents during the two-year period (R. 85). 
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During the last six or eight months, the defendant and 
plaintiff's wife would draw the blinds down and turn 
the lights down low (R. 86). Many times she saw the 
defendant and plaintiff's wife leave the plaintiff's home 
together· (R. 87-88). They would return just before 
plaintiff would be back from work. During the two-year 
period, 1952-1953, defendant and plaintiff's wife would 
go out on an average of about three times a week (R. 87-
88). The witness never called these things to the atten-
tion of plaintiff ( R. 89). 
Exhibit '' 4'' is a collection of phonograph records 
,\rhich defendant brought to plaintiff's home, hav.ing such 
titles as "I Want to Play House With You" and "I Am 
Walking Behind You.'' 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE 
DEFENDANT. 
(a) BY REASON OF SECTION 30-3-9, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953. 
(b) BY REASON OF THE CLAIMED INSUFFI~ 
CIENCY OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE. 
2. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS IN-
STRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
(a) IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER 
THE STATE OF PLAINTIFF'S FEELINGS 
AS AFFECTING THE CHILDREN. 
(b) IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER 
. PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
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ana 3. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
\urn DEFENDAXT'S :MO'riON FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
't11 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO DIRECT ~\ VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE 
DEFI1~N"DANT. 
U;. (a) BY REASON OF SECTION 30-3-9, UTAH 
1tt1r CODE ANNOTATED 1953. 
It is true that the above statute provides that the 
; 01~ guilty party in a divorce action forfeits all rights ac-
~u~n quired by the marriage. The right to sue an interloper 
Llm for his tortious conduct in alienating the affections of 
the wife is not a right acquired by the marriage. This is 
clearly shown in the case of DeFord vs. Johnson, 251 Mo. 
244, 158 S.W. 29,46 L.R.A. New Series, 1003, from which 
we quote as follows : 
,n'J 
JER 
''The right to sue is one which must arise 
'vhile the marital relationship exists, but it is not 
a right which grows out of the marital relation-
ship, and is not one of the forfeited rights men-
tioned in the statute. The rights and claims 
referred to in this statute are rights and claims 
between husband and wife which spring up by 
reason of the marriage, and the statute has no 
reference whatever to the tortious act of a third 
party during the existence of the marriage rela-
tionship, which tortious act gives the husband a 
cause of action as against such third party. To 
present an abc case, if a railway cripple and 
injure the wife of A, so that he is deprived of her 
society and aid, is the right of action a right and 
claim under and by virtue of the marriage? We 
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think not. ~either is the cause of action stated in 
this petition such a claim or right.'' 
On rehearing the court reiterated the same principle 
as defendant has set forth on page 9 of his brief. The 
~fissouri court (577 S.W.) says that the statute: 
"clearly refers, in apt words, to rights and claims 
which the marriage gives him, and not to those-
which come from a violation of his marriage 
rights; to rights and claims which effect the in-
terests of his wife, and not to those which exist 
only between himself and strangers.'' 
A wife decreed to be guilty in a divorce action would 
forfeit the right she acquired by the marriage to the 
support of her husband. However, the statute was not 
intended to benefit a third party tort feasor by relieving 
him of the consequences of his intentional and malicious 
wrong committed against the plaintiff, while the plaintiff 
enjoyed and had a right to enjoy the love and affection 
of his wife. It is purely a matter of chronology. Cer-
tainly the guilty party in a divorce action could not 
maintain an action for alienation of affection if the 
wrongs constituting the alienation were committed sub-
sequent to the divorce after the right to the affection 
of the wife was forfeited. Prior to the divorce, the plain-
tiff enjoyed all the rights and privileges of a husband, 
and prior to the treacherous intrusion of the defendant 
he enjoyed the love and affection of his wife. The right 
of action for the alienation of that love and affection 
could be extinguished only by payment of a considera-
tion, supporting a release and satisfaction of a claim, 
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or by the lapse of time prescribed by the appropriate 
statute of limitation. 
Since the DeFord vs. Johnson case, the Missouri 
Court has again upheld the right of the guilty party in 
a divorce action to sue for the alienation of affections. 
See Pollard vs. Ward, (Mo.), 233 S.W. 14, 20 A.L.R. 936. 
The case contains an excellent discussion on the general 
rule that a decree of divorce does not bar an action for 
previous alienation of affection. We also commend to 
the attention of the court the annotation on the subject, 
commencing at page 943 of 20 A.L.R. 
Counsel for the defendant at the trial and on this 
appeal has made much of the fact that the plaintiff did 
not oppose the divorce and thus became the guilty party 
at the proceedings; that the plaintiff ''sat mute and per-
mitted the court to act on his wife's testimony". Human 
pride is such that it often caus~s a person grievously 
wronged to permit a wife who has withdrawn her affec-
tions to obtain a divorce without contest. This is within 
the experience of all lawyers and judges. The defendant, 
Knapton, and his new wife, the former Mrs. Sadlier, 
were present in court throughout this trial and heard 
the narration of the repeated acts of treachery of the 
defendant, extending over a. period of years, yet neither 
took the stand to refuse or to explain. They heard the 
plaintiff testify that his wife had been influenced by the 
defendant to leave plaintiff (R. 32); that plaintiff and 
his wife never quarreled prior to the separation; that 
she had never complained to him of anything that dis-
satisfied her with the marriage; that plaintiff's mother 
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(whose interference ·with the domestic affairs of the 
plaintiff and his former wife was complained of by the 
wife in the divorce proceedings) talked to the defendant 
oi1ly !\vice about his numerous visits to the Sadleir home, 
and then in the ftiendliest of terms. This the defei1dant 
did not s:ee fit. to deny. The defendant, l{napton, also 
heard the plaintiff testify that he, l{napton, promised 
to withdraw and to advise plaintiff's wife to remain with 
the phtintiff to keep plaintiff's home intact, and that on 
t~1e occasion set apart for this purpose the defendant 
treacherously broke his promise, made avowals of love 
and offered to support the plaintiff's wife and pay for 
th~ cost of the divorce proceedings, if she would leave 
the plaintiff. The defendant sat mute in court and did 
not see fit to deny_ these facts, and he now seeks the shel-
ter ofa law ":'hich was not intended to benefit him at all, 
a:Jaw which was. intended to. terminate rights existing 
between a man and his wife, not to cleanse the soiled 
ha~ds of a wrongdoer. 
Again counsel for defendant urges that public policy 
requires that a guilty third party be exonerated from 
~he consequences of his wrongful acts by the same statute 
that provides for the forfeiture of marital rights of a 
guilty party in a divorce action. This is a strange doc-
trine which flies in the face of the long-established public 
policy of preserving the sanctity of the marriage rela-
tionship and of punishing those who intentionally and 
maliciously seek to drive a wedge between a man and his 
wife. This policy goes all the way back to the Tenth 
Collliilandment in the 20th Chapter of Exodus and finds 
10 
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voi<:e in aU of our criminal and civil laws pertaining to 
wrongs committed against the marriage relationship. 
How can the public interest ever be preserved by shelter-
ing and protecting him who covets another man's wife~ 
Counsel for the defendant states that the causal 
connection between the defendant's conduct and the loss 
of Vera's affection for the plaintiff is completely dissi-
pated by the divorce decree itself, and the adjudication 
thereby that the plaintiff herein was the guilty party. 
The great weight of authority is contrary to this view 
of the defendant. See Nevins t·. Nevins, 68 Kan. 410, 7G 
P. 492, in which it was claimed that the plaintiff's own 
acts constituted or contributed to the alienation of the 
affections. The court held: 
''In such an action, if the acts done and in-
fluences used by the defendant were the con-
trolling cause of the separation, the plaintiff may 
recover from the defendant, although other causes 
may have contributed in some degree to the 
result.'' 
See also Hope t'. Twarling, (Neb.), 198 N.W. 161, 
which holds: 
'' ... In an action for the alienation of a hus-
band's affection, a prior decree of divorce may be 
admitted in evidence to prove marriage and the 
se,·ering of the conjugal relationship, but it is 
not a former adjudication with respect to the 
subsequent cause of action, and it does not operate 
as an estoppel by judgment. 
"Defendant in the present action wa~ not a 
party to the former suit of divorce and is not 
entitled to any of the fruits of that litigation." 
11 
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To the same effect is Grirtz l'. Leiser, (Colo.), 58 P. 
2d 481, and 42 C.J.S. 323. 
This court in Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 
P. 2d 59, disposed of the contention that the husband in 
that case had already lost the affections of his wife by 
saying, as could be said here: 
"A full answer to this is found in the fact that 
the evidence was conflicting on these matters.'' 
We feel that the trial court erred against the plain-
tiff in accepting in evidence the findings of fact and 
decree in the divorce action without limiting the jury's 
consideration thereof (R. 48) and in instructing the jury 
that the findings and decree were conclusive evidence of 
the facts therein found, notwithstanding the testimony 
of the plaintiff which was contrary to the evidence pre-
sented in the divorce proceeding. The matters found 
and considered in the divorce proceedings were res 
judicata against the world only to the extent of judicially 
establishing the prior existence of the marriage and its 
dissolution and the status of the parties thereafter under 
the decree. To that extent only is the divorce judgment 
a judgment in rem and res judicata in this action. See 
Luick v. Arends, 21 N.D. 614, 132 N.W. 353; Prettyman 
v. Williamson, (Del.), 39 Atl. 731; Hostetter v. Green, 
(Ky.), 167 S.W. 919. ... 
It was held in Luke v. Hill, 137 Ga. 159, 38 L.R.A. 
N.S. 559, 73 S.E. 345, that a spouse who is suing and 
against whom a divorce has been granted is not estopped 
from contesting, in an action against a stranger, to that 
12 
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decree, the truth of the grounds on which the decree was 
prayed. 
In the case of Sickler v. Marnnix, 68 Neb. 21, 93 N.vV. 
1018, the wife brought an action for the alienation of 
affection after the husband had been granted a divorce 
on the ground of extreme cruelty. The court refused to 
admit the decree in evidence saying: 
"Mrs. Sickler (the defendant) was not a party 
to that suit, and it is only where a judicial record 
contains an admission of one or the other of the 
parties to it that it is admissible as such in favor 
of a stranger .... ~Irs. Mannix (the plaintiff) did 
not admit in her pleadings in the divorce case that 
she had been guilty of extreme cruelty to her hus-
band. On the contrary she denied and contested 
the judgment, and the fact that the court found 
against her on the trial does not make such finding 
admissible against her in favor of a stranger, on 
the trial of another action.'' 
It is true that the plaintiff as the defendant in the 
divorce action did not answer or defend, but his default 
would not constitute an admission of the charge of the 
complaint. It simply indicated that he was not going to 
contest it. Our statute, Section 30-3-4, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, requires that no decree of divorce shall be 
granted upon default or otherwise, except upon legal 
evidence taken in the cause. In this connection, we desire 
to refer the court to the case of Thomas v. Thomas, (Mo.), 
186 S.W. 993, from which we quote as follows: 
" ... By statute in nearly all the states, in-
cluding Missouri and Tennessee, defendant's 
failure to answer does not warrant a decree, but 
13 
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the proof of the cause of action must be made. In 
those states having no statute like ours, the rult> 
is nevertheless the same. The courts have, in fact, 
treated the common law as including the applic-
able canonical rule, that an express admission 
does not, of itself, justify a decree. 3 Wigmore 
on Evidence, Section 2067. In view of this, it is 
not correct to treat a default in a divorre suit 
as an admission of the allegations of the petition 
which may be put in evidence by a stranger in 
another action against the divorced defendant. A 
defendant in a divorce proceeding omitting to 
answer must be held to know, that even in the 
divorce case his silence does not constitute an 
admission of the allegations of the petition, which 
the plaintiff can rely upon for any purpose in 
obtaining the decree. How then can it be said 
that an act or omission which implies no admis-
sion in the case in which it is done is available 
as an implied admission in a subsequent action 
by a stranger to the divorce proceeding~ We 
think there is no ground upon "\vhich such a doc-
trine can be supported . . . '' 
"It follows from the conclusions stated that 
the failure to answer constituted no admission 
available to a stranger in another action, that 
such failure had no tendency to contradict Green 
B. Thomas's testimony, even if a proper founda-
tion had been laid. No information was laid in 
fact. It is true also, of this, that there was no 
element of estoppel in failure to answer in the 
divorce case.'' 
Plaintiff, therefore, had the right in this action 
against Knapton to establish facts contrary to the testi-
mony given by his wife at previous divorce proceedings, 
and there was nothing in the testimony of Mrs. Knapton 
14 
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that could be used as an admission against the plaintiff 
herein. Counsel for the defendant did not see fit to avail 
himself of l\irs. Knapton's testimony in this action, al-
though she was present throughout the trial, but was 
contented to rely entirely upon the findings and decree 
in the divorce matter. 
(b) BY REASON OF THE CLAIMED INSUFFI-
CU~NCY OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE. 
It requires only a perusal of the summary of facts 
set forth in this brief, together with those referred to in 
defendant's brief, to dispose· of defendant's contention 
that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict. 
The defendant carried on a long, persistent campaign 
to obtain for himselfthe affections of the plaintiff's wife. 
Prior to his conduct which finally resulted in the aliena-
tion of Mrs. Sadleir 's affections, the plaintiff and his 
wife enjoyed a pleasant and happy marriage. According 
to the testimony of the plaintiff and the people who lived 
around his home their marriage was an ideal one, free 
from many of the disturbances and difficulties that some-
times attend other marriage situations. The fact that the 
plaintiff's wife finally left him and married the defendant 
is a sufficient proof of the accomplishment and fruition 
of defendant's design to deprive the plaintiff of his wife's 
love and affection. 
Counsel for the defendant recklessly states that 
there is no testimony in the case showing that the cause 
of the loss of Vera's affection was other than as reflected 
in the divorce pro~eedings. Of course, the plaintiff 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
refuted all the matters testified to in the diyorce pro-
ceedings relative to his misconduct. Furthermore, in the 
conference between the plaintiff, the defendant, and Vera 
which took place in the Sadleir home on or about the 
8th or 9th day of January, 1954, the plaintiff testified as 
follows: 
'' Q: What was actually said' 
''A: Said that he loved her and wanted to 
marry her, and that if she would leave me that 
he would support them and so forth-support her 
through the time it takes to get a divorce decree 
until it is final; he would pay for the divorce and 
everything. That was mainly what was said and 
-I don't know-he just agreed with her. vVhat-
ever she wanted, that was it. He was going to-
he wanted her and that was the way he was going 
to get her, (R. 29)." 
Thereafter, the plaintiff's wife left him and they 
never lived together again. The divorce action was soon 
filed and a decree obtained on February 26, 1954, (Ex-
hibit 1-D), and Vera married the defendant. 
2. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS IN-
STRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
(a) IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER 
THE STATE OF PLAINTIFF'S FEELINGS 
AS AFFECTING THE CHILDREN. 
Thoughtful study of instruction No. 13 (R. 127) 
given by the trial court does not disclose a basis for the 
objection made by the defendant. The jury was not told, 
as counsel asserts, that the plaintiff could recover for the 
loss of the society of his children, although we do not 
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f£x. 
concede that such loss may not be included in the con~ 
sicleration of damages. The Oldroyd case in discussing 
elements of damage in this type of case used the 
language: 
''The jury were properly advised of the ele-
ments that could be considered in assessing the 
damages. They were entitled to accept the version 
of the plaintiff and his witnesses that the de-
fendant wilfully and wrongfully alienated away 
the affections of ~Irs. Wilson, who was a capable, 
industrious and attractive woman, and who there-
tofore had been a loving and devoted wife and 
mother with whom plaintiff was rearing his chil-
dren in a happy home." 
This language aptly fits the eYidence in this case and 
the form of the instruction given by the trial court. 
(b) IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
:Malice was clearly shown by the evidence in this 
case. As a matter of fact, the word "malice" is hardly 
a strong enough term with which to appropriately char-
~- acterize the proceedings of the defendant who walked 
through the open door of his best friend's home and 
while in the full enjoyment of the plaintiff's hospitality, 
friendship and trust, looked upon his best friend's wife 
with lustful and covetous eyes, and formulated the. treach-
erous and evil design of stealing her away from the 
plaintiff. It was not a single act of thoughtlessness or 
impetuosity. It was a campaign extending through the 
years. Night after night, the defendant called at plain-
tiff's home, always just before meal time, -always. after 
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he knew plaintiff was at his regular work. He sat in the 
midst of plaintiff's family and supped at plaintiff's table 
night after night throughout the years, remaining as 
long as possible, leaving only minutes before he knew 
the plaintiff was to return, spending the evening making 
intimate and improper advances upon plaintiff's wife. 
Then he would sneak away with the resolve to return 
again the following day to commit the same wrongs. 
The court was fully authorized in permitting the 
jury to consider punitive damages. In the case of lYilson 
v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P. 2d 759, this court quoted 
with approval from the Missouri case of Butterfield v. 
Ennis, 193 Missouri Appeals 638, 186 S.W. 1173, as 
follows: 
"The enticing away of another man's wife is 
an act inherently wrong and necessarily known to 
be wrong and if the alienation from the husband 
is intentionally done, the law implies malice from 
these facts." 
This court then said : 
"We conclude that the jury could reasonably 
believe that in continuing to make love to Mrs. 
Wilson after being warned to desist, the defend-
ant did so wilfully and with such wanton disre-
gard of the plaintiff's rights that an award of 
punitive damages was justified.'' 
In the case at bar, Knapton was like "one of the 
family", as counsel for the defendant aptly concludes, 
and while he enjoyed the hospitality of the Sadleir home 
and complete confidence and trust of the plaintiff, he 
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formulated and rarried into effect almost nightly a 
treacherous plan to usurp plaintiff's rightful possession 
in the affections of his wife. It is difficult for my mind 
to conceive of a situation more pregnant with malice 
and with guilty design and intent, with reckless disregard 
for all the common decencies, than the conduct of the 
defendant disclosed by the evidence in this record. As 
though this were not enough, defendant's malice was 
emphasized by his reaction to the kindly suggestion of 
plaintiff's mother that he stop calling at plaintiff's home 
when plaintiff was at work berause the neighbors were 
talking. The mother in her kindness told the defendant 
not to mention the fact that she had talked to him to the 
plaintiff, or to plaintiff's wife, and indicated that every-
thing would be fine if he would limit his visits. She had 
said to him, ''we won't say anything to Vera and Earl. 
You go on the canyon trip (with them) and have a good 
time. When you come back you just gradually stop 
coming and everything will be all right.'' The defendant, 
seemingly treacherous by nature, responded to this kind-
ness h~, falsely reporting immediately to plaintiff and 
1aoi) to plaintiff's wife that plaintiff's mother had ordered 
Mn him out of the house, and then after he had satisfied the 
itb~ plaintiff of the genuineness of his friendship he increased 
his visits to the Sadleir home, loeked the door, drew the 
blinds and turned down the lights, so that he could con-
tinue making love to plaintiff's wife to the tune of the 
'!h record, ''I Want to Play House With You''. Hav:ing 
idt:, succeeded in driving the wedge between the plaintiff and 
orot his wife and in accomplishing the transfer Gf her affec-
tions from their rightful possessor to him, under the 
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circumstances disclosed by this record, he has the temer-
ity, through the mouth of eloquent counsel, to vouchsafe 
innocence and friendship throughout his proceedings, 
and seeks to delude this court with the representation 
that his conduct was free from criticism or blame. When 
the realization was finally brought home to the plaintiff 
that defendant had succeeded in stealing the affections 
of his wife, plaintiff asked defendant to leave his wife 
alone and asked him if he would come down and tell 
plaintiff's wife that he, Knapton, didn't love her, and 
th~t he would withdraw. To this Knapton agreed further 
stating that he would back the plaintiff up in an attempt 
to convince plaintiff's wife to remain in her own home 
with the plaintiff (R. 28). The following day Knapton 
went to the plaintiff's home and again demonstrated hi's 
treachery by telling plaintiff's wife that he loved her 
and wanted to marry her and that if she would leave 
plaintiff he would support her and the children and would 
pay for the divorce and everything (R. 29). We submit 
that the evidence, unchallenged and unexplained by the 
defendant, compelled a finding of malice by the jury. 
3. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The conclusion that the court did not err in denying 
defendant's motion for a new trial necessarily follows 
the matters heretofore considered in this brief. The 
amount of the verdict and of the punitive damages was 
not excessive and did not reflect passion or prejudice on 
the part of the jury. The trial court was most liberal to 
the defendant. The defendant requested six instructions, 
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v. 
all of which were given by the trial court. The court 
told the jury in instruction No. 15 that the findings and 
decree in the divorce action were conclusive aR to the 
facts therein found (R. 129). In its instruction No. 10 
(R. 124), the trial court instructed the jury that in order 
to find for the plaintiff, apart from the consideration of 
punitive damages, they would have to believe that the 
defendant's acts were not only intentional but malicious. 
Plaintiff excepted to this in~truction ( R. 105). We do 
not urge these matters at this time, having prevailed 
in the court below, but we mention them only for the 
purpose of showing that defendant's theory was more 
than adequately presented to the jury in the court's in-
structions. 
(jOXCLUSION 
However distasteful a proceeding for alienation of 
affection may be to the guilty defendant, it is in the 
public interest that the marriage institution be strength-
ened and respected, and that those who seek to under-
mine and destroy it be punished for their wrongs. There 
were many unattached women in the world who could 
have been legitimate objects of the defendant's pursuit. 
His conduct in destroying the happy home of his best 
friend to satisfy his own covetousness was indefensible. 
The evidence, as disclosed by this record, fully supports 
the verdict of the jury and we earnestly submit that the 
judgment appealed from should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WOODROW D. WHITE, 
Attorney for Respondent 
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